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Abstract – A wireless PLC/SCADA network has been set up to 
investigate the reliability of wireless communication systems in a 
local area network. It has been shown that the integrity of data 
flow can be maintained within certain limits of the signal 
strength in a coverage area of an Access Point. The Wi-Fi can 
successfully be applied in industrial operations provided a care-
ful site surveys has been be conducted and the boundaries are 
determined to ensure adequate signal strength to avoid any pos-
sible dropouts however short lived they may be. It has also been 
shown that if the dropout occurs the self repair capability of the 
communication system may not be sufficient thus requiring 
manual interference that may not be tolerable in many process 
control operations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In many industrial operations, sensors and actuators are net-
worked through Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) as 
they play important role in monitoring and controlling opera-
tions. Today there are different types of PLCs with different 
capacity and functionality. The modern PLCs are capable to 
communicate with other PLCs and devices since they usually 
are equipped with communications ports such as the RS232, 
RS485, and Ethernet. Various fieldbuses such as Modbus, 
DeviceNet or Profibus can be used as communication tools. 
PLCs are capable of controlling a wide range of sensors and 
output devices and have ability to incorporate and transfer 
real data to the system [1], [2]. Because of many advantages 
the PLCs are one of the most widely used devices in indus-
trial control system.  
 
Most PLC control systems are based on wired communica-
tion networks. Nevertheless, many industrial organizations 
are willing to use a wireless networks for monitoring and 
controlling. This prompts issues relating to the integration of 
older and newer technologies while the new technologies are 
implemented, along with the sensitivity to system quality and 
reliability factors associated with the transmission of infor-
mation in wireless media [3], [4]. This paper investigates 
some safety and reliability aspects in the applications of wire-
less networks in industrial operations. 
In addition PLC technology, Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems are used in modern industrial 
operations. SCADA is a term adopted by the process control 
industry to describe a collection of computers, sensors and 
other equipment suitably interfaced in order to monitor and 
control processes. Traditionally, remote control operations 
are achieved by the use of telemetry, which is a technology 
that gathers and sends information from and to remote loca-
tions from a central station by radio frequency communica-
tion devices [5]. 
 
The purpose of the central control station is to gather data 
from various Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and provide a 
Human Machine Interface (HMI). Operators, at the central 
stations are familiar with HMI software for the display of 
information coming from the sensors and transducers and 
other field device and they control of the process by using 
HMI. The HMI interface computers are connected to Local 
Area Network – LAN, some of the recent developed SCADA 
applications support Nowadays SCADA is very sophisticated 
that Web interface HMI stations make process control ob-
servable through the Internet [6]. SCADA system supports 
more that one Master station, which provides redundancy in 
case of any problems associated with a master station. Data-
base servers are also implemented to store the information 
gathered from the field devices. Figure 1 illustrates the com-
ponent of a SCADA system. 
 
II. THE COMMUNICATION STRATEGY 
In this paper, a wireless network containing 20 PLC/SCADA 
systems has been configured as a Local Area Network, LAN. 
The PLCs and SCADA set up has been based on the Factory 
Intelligent Network Services (FINS) Gateway (termed as 
FinsGateway) for communication purposes. FinsGateway is a 
powerful technique for factory automation FINS commands 
allow different types of instructions to be passed from one 
network type to another, regardless of the protocol type used 
on the network. This enables intercommunication capabilities 
across multiple networks and makes the controlling or moni-
toring of the PLCs possible from different network types. 
FINS Commands are defined in the application level and do 
not depend on lower levels (i.e. the physical and data link 
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levels) hence can be used across a variety of networks and 
CPU buses, specifically with Ethernet, Controller Link, and 
Host Link networks, and between CPU Units and CPU Bus 
Units [8], [9]. 
 
 
Figure 1 SCADA System hardware components [7] 
 
Apart from the local communications between PLCs and 
SCADA, it was important to select a communication system 
that could be used to monitor and control the PLCs remotely. 
Different wireless technologies were investigated and in or-
der to find the most suitable technology, the selection was 




• Speed  
 
The bandwidth was important because the monitoring was 
required to take place in real time. Supervisory packages de-
manded high bandwidth; therefore selecting a wireless tech-
nology with higher bandwidth was an advantage. The range 
of communication between wireless stations was also impor-
tant, as the aim was to provide flexibility and maximum dis-
tance between the wireless clients. Security on the other 
hand, has become an important issue in wireless communica-
tion as inadequate security poses significant disruption risk in 
industry processes that use wireless communication. The 
speed was important since the network was relatively large 
and demanding continuous information flow between the 
devices that are geographically distributed. 
 
The most suitable wireless technology that would be readily 
available and meets the all the above criteria considered to be 
the 802.11 Wi-Fi. The Wi-Fi is an IEEE 802 protocol that 
expands the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) reference 
model at the physical and Data Link Layer (DLL). The DDL 
layer consists of two additional sublayers: Logical Link Con-
trol (LLC) and Media Access Control. The LLC sublayer 
controls data link communication and defines the use of the 
logical interface pints. The MAC sublayer provides shared 
access of multiple devices in the physical layer. MAC di-
rectly communicates with Network Interface Cards (NICs) 
and is responsible for ensuring error free data communication 
between the network and NICs. The role of the physical layer 
802.11 is to handle the transmission of data between nodes. 
In the LAN systems, the signal is modulated using spread 
spectrum, which is a technique that generates and expands 
bandwidth signal [10], [11]. 
 
In this study special attention was paid for network security 
as there are devices in the marketplace offering different 
levels and types of security. The security in 802.11 protocol 
family is defined by 802.11i protocol. In early years of 
implementation of 802.11 protocol, where the security was 
not an issue the data have been encrypted by using a Wired 
Equivalent Privacy (WEP) algorithm. The data exchanged 
between wireless stations is ciphered with a 40 or 128 bit 
WEB encryption key. The WEB algorithm, however, at-
tempts to serve as both authentication and a privacy mecha-
nism [12]. In order to address the issue of weak security, the 
Wi-Fi Alliance announced specification to improve Authenti-
cation Framework called Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), 
which is based on 802.11i protocol and is intended to 
improve the security by increasing the size of the keys and 
the Initialization Vector, thereby reducing the number of 
packets sent with related keys, and adding a secure message 
verification system. In order to improve the Authentication 
Algorithm WPA introduced Extensible Authentication 
Protocol (EAP), which supports EAP-Transport Layer 
Security (EAP-TLS). To incorporate the new advanced 
security measures the users authenticate to a RADIUS 
(Remote Authentication Dial in User Service) server [12], 
[13], [14]. 
 
III. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION 
The wireless PLC network was supported by Cisco Aironet 
1200 system. The network was distributed in various rooms 
in a building as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2 Experimental wireless network topology 
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The Cisco Aironet 1200 system could function as an access 
point or bridge whether set as a single-band or dual-band 
platform, allowing each radio to be individually configured as 
an access point repeater, root bridge, non-root bridge or 
workgroup bridge, enabling a broad array of applications 
[15]. The access point has unified IDS/IPS features enabled 
for the wireless security. 
 
The management frame protection of the Cisco Aironet 1200 
was part of its infrastructure, which allows the network to 
detect spoofed frames from access points or malicious users 
impersonating infrastructure access points. If an access point 
detects a malicious attack, an incident will be generated by 
the access points and reports will be gathered on the Cisco 
wireless LAN controller, Cisco WCS, or CiscoWorks WLSE. 
The Access point has hardware-Assisted AES Encryption, 
which provides high security without performance degrada-
tion. Also, the access point is IEEE 802.11 i-Compliant; 
WPA2-Certified and WPA-Certified, which helps to ensure 
interoperable security with wireless LAN client devices from 
other manufacturers [16].  
 
During the experiment the Cisco Aironet 1200 was config-
ured by HyperTerminal. A RS-232 serial cable was con-
nected between the access point’s configuration port and a 
com port of the PC terminal. The configuration of the Hyper-
Terminal is shown in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1 Configuration settings of the HyperTerminal 
 
After completion of the PLC, SCADA and Wireless Network 
implementation, the system was integrated and ready to run 
the simulation of a Car Washing Process. The simulation 
could be operated by the PLC as well as from the control 
buttons on the HMI terminal. The PLCs were connected to 
the access point via a network hub. The access point and the 
wireless station communicated wirelessly at 11 MB using 
IEEE802.11 protocol.  The screen shots of CWS simulation is 
shown in Figure 3, which illustrates four different processes 
of the car washing: spraying the soapy water, rinsing with 
water, drying and moving the car out from the base station. 
 
During the monitoring it was important that the integrity of 
data was maintained. Therefore information flow from the 
tags of the SCADA has been monitored continuously by ex-
porting them into an EXCEL files as shown in Figure 4. For 
this, Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) for Process Con-
trol (OPC) client software have been configured. OPC is a 
new technology designed to bridge Windows based applica-
tions and process control hardware. It is an open standard that 
is used to access field data from plant floor devices. The OPC 
client used during the data integrity checking was from the 








Figure 4 Monitoring of the tags from EXCEL output file 
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The information flow form the tags of the SCADA were 
gathered in the form of EXEL files for the following cases: 
 
• PLC 10m apart from the Access Point 
• PLC 30m apart from the Access Point 
• PLC 50m apart from the Access Point 
 
Many experiments were conducted for testing of reliable and 
continuous operations. A typical connection historical data 




Figure 5 Wi-Fi set of serial-wireless access point 
 
When the distance between the Access point and the wireless 
client was 10m the signal strength was measured as 92% with 





Figure 6 Signal strength and response time from 10m 
 
When the distance between the Access point and the wireless 
client was 30m the signal strength was measured as 55% with 
the response time of 18ms, shown in Figure 7.  
 
 
Figure 7 Signal strength and response time from 30m 
 
When the distance between the Access point and the wireless 
client was 50m the signal strength was measured as with an 
inconsistent the response time. It was noted that after 600ms 




Figure 8 Signal strength and response time from 50m 
 
When the connection has dropped out, the tags in the output 
file did not match the tags results of the base file. When the 
laptop was moved few meters towards the Access Point, the 
wireless connectivity was re-established and PLC responded. 
However, after the re-establishing connectivity the simulation 
did not run without re-initializing the FinsGateway services. 
When the error on the FinsGateway was cleared the applica-
tion restarted. Restoring the FinsGateway services was about 
30s, which may be regarded to be unacceptable in many in-
dustrial applications that require continuous operations. 
 
These results have shown that although transmission power 
of Wi-Fi can be improved by the use of suitable antennae if 
the power is already set there is a limit in the operations be-
fore a dropout occurs. Unlike many wireless sensor networks 
where dropouts and network recovery are tolerated by the 
design, clearly dropout may not be permissible in large net-
works that require continuous operations. Process control is a 
typical example of the systems that require continuous opera-
tions for safety reasons, emergency, and inherent dataflow 
requirements between sensors and control devices. This is 
particularly important in processes where continuous feed-
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back systems are involved. This work is expanded to close 
feedback control systems that are integrated with wireless 
communication networks.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this study it has been shown that the Wi-Fi can be used for 
wireless operation of PLC/SCADA process control systems. 
Given the transmission power of the wireless system, the data 
integrity of dataflow can be maintained while the signal 
strength between the wireless client and the Access Point is 
maintained at the level above 45% with response delay no 
more than 600ms. For successful applications of Wi-Fi in 
process control industry site surveys should be conducted to 
determine the boundaries of the coverage area where there is 
sufficient signal strength. The coverage area can also be ex-
tended by installing a second Access Point where coverage 
areas overlap with the first Access Point. 
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